State v. Shelton Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 42041 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-22-2014
State v. Shelton Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42041
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Shelton Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42041" (2014). Not Reported. 1892.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1892
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA 
STATE OF IDAHO, OPY 
No. 42041 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Boundary Co. Case No. 
CR-2013-727 
DARLENE K. SHEL TON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
__________ ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
HONORABLE JOHN T. MITCHELL 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
NICOLE L. SCHAFER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
KIMBERLY E. SMITH 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................... 1 
ISSUE .............................................................................................................. 3 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 4 
The Trial Court Correctly Concluded Shelton Was Not 
Entitled To Suppression Since There Was Probable 
Cause To Believe Shelton Was Driving Under The Influence .............. .4 
A. lntroduction ................................................................................. 4 
B. Standard Of Review .................................................................. .4 
C. Shelton Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial 
Of Her Suppression Motion ........................................................ 5 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................... ? 
APPENDIX A 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) .................................................................. 6 
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) .......................................................... 6 
Borley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 233 P.3d 102 (2010) ........................................ 4 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) ...................................................... 6 
Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) ........................................................... 5 
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008) .................................. 4 
State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 625 P.2d 1093 (1981) ...................................... 6 
State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 964 P.2d 660 (1998) ......................................... 5, 6 
State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 198 P.3d 128 (Ct. App. 2008) ....................... 5 
State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 51 P.3d 461 (Ct. App. 2002) .......................... 5 
State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 P.3d 182 (2009) ........................................ 4 
State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 90 P.3d 926 (Ct. App. 2004) .................................. 5 
State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 88 P.3d 1220 (Ct. App. 2003) .......................... 5 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) .......................................................................... 5 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) ......................................................... 6 
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) ..................................................... 5 
I! 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Darlene K. Shelton appeals from the judgment entered upon her 
conditional pleas of guilty to possession of methamphetamine, possession of 
paraphernalia, and driving under the influence. Shelton contends the district 
court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Law enforcement stopped Shelton's vehicle after she failed to use her turn 
signal exiting a parking lot. (PSI, p.3.) Shelton's eyes were glazed, her speech 
"excitable and slurred," and she was unsteady on her feet. (Id.) Additionally, the 
officer could smell the odor of burnt marijuana. (Id.) After Shelton failed 
standardized failed sobriety tests, law enforcement searched her vehicle and 
found a gram of methamphetamine inside Shelton's purse. (Id.) 
The state charged Shelton with felony possession of a controlled 
substance, possession of paraphernalia, and operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence (DUI). (R., pp.37-39.) Shelton filed a motion to suppress 
asserting her "warrantless detention, search of [her] purse and vehicle, and 
arrest by the officers was unlawful and without legal justification." (R., p.48 
(emphasis original).) 
Following a hearing and briefing on the motion, the trial court issued a 
written memorandum decision and order denying defendant's motion to 
suppress, finding there was probable cause to conduct the search at issue. (R., 
pp.111-133.) 
1 
Shelton entered conditional pleas of guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance, possession of paraphernalia, and DUI, reserving the right to appeal 
the denial of her motion to suppress. (R., pp.140-155.) The court placed Shelton 
on three years felony probation with an underlying suspended sentence of three 
years fixed followed by four years indeterminate. (R., pp.159-163.) Shelton 
timely appealed. (R., pp.173-176.) 
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ISSUE 
Shelton states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Shelton's motion 
to suppress? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Shelton failed to show error in the denial of her motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court Correctly Concluded Shelton Was Not Entitled To Suppression 
Since There Was Probable Cause To Believe Shelton Was Driving Under The 
Influence 
A Introduction 
Shelton claims that the evidence found pursuant to a search of her purse 
subsequent to her arrest for DUI should have been suppressed because, she 
argues, "[d]espite the fact that the district court found credible Officer Cowell's 
testimony that he smelled the odor of burnt marijuana coming from Ms. Shelton's 
car and that he observed objective physical signs that Ms. Shelton was under the 
influence," "her detention was illegally prolonged and the search of her purse was 
unlawful." (Appellant's brief, p.4.) Review of the record and the applicable legal 
standards demonstrate Shelton's arguments fail. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a district court order granting or denying a 
suppression motion is bifurcated: factual findings are accepted unless clearly 
erroneous, but the Court freely reviews the application of constitutional principles 
to the facts found. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 
(2009). On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision to determine whether it correctly decided the issues presented to it on 
appeal." Borleyv. Smith, 149 Idaho 171,176,233 P.3d 102,107 (2010); see 
also Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008). 
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C. Shelton Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of Her Suppression 
Motion 
"The Fourth Amendment safeguard against unreasonable searches and 
seizures applies to the seizures of persons through arrests or detentions falling 
short of arrest." State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650, 51 P.3d 461, 464 (Ct. 
App. 2002) (citations omitted). "Under Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)], an 
investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts 
which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be 
engaged in criminal activity." State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 
1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). "The justification for an investigate detention is 
evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances then known to the officer." kl 
(citations omitted). "[A)n investigative detention must be temporary and last no 
longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. Roe, 140 
Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926,931 (Ct. App. 2004). "There is no rigid time-limit for 
determining when a detention has lasted longer than necessary; rather, a court 
must consider the scope of the detention and the law enforcement purposes to 
be served, as well as the duration of the stop." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 
490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 
U.S. 675, 685-86 (1985)). 
The automobile exception is a well-established exception to the warrant 
requirement. Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3 (1980); State v. Buti, 131 
Idaho 793, 800, 964 P.2d 660, 667 (1998). The "automobile exception" to the 
warrant requirement allows the police to search a vehicle without a warrant when 
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there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of 
a crime. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 
U.S. 753, 760 (1979); State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 964 P.2d 660 (1998); State v. 
Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 93, 625 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1981). The existence of 
probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity 
"authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be 
found." Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 347 (2009) (citing United States v. Ross, 
456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982)). 
Shelton was pulled over for failing to signal as she exited a parking lot. 
(R., pp.112-113.) After making contact, the officer could smell the odor of burnt 
marijuana and made the following observations about Shelton: her eyes were 
glazed, her speech "excitable and slurred," and she was unsteady on her feet. 
(R., p.114.) After Shelton failed standardized failed sobriety tests, law 
enforcement searched her vehicle and found a gram of methamphetamine inside 
Shelton's purse. (R., p.118.) On appeal, Shelton does not challenge any of the 
district court's factual findings. Nor does she argue that the district court erred in 
its interpretation of the law. Instead, she merely reiterates the arguments that 
were made to and rejected by the district court, "despite the fact" that the court 
found the officer's testimony below credible. Shelton's arguments fail for all of 
the reasons set forth in the district court's well-written and well-reasoned 
Memorandum Decision And Order Denying Defendant's Motion To Suppress, 
which the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (R., pp.111-134 (attached 
hereto as Appendix A).) 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment entered 
upon Shelton's conditional guilty pleas to possession of a controlled substance, 
possession of paraphernalia, and driving under the influence. 
DATED this 22nd day of Decemb r 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of December, 2014, served 
a true and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
KIMBERLY E. SMITH 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in the State Appellate Publi 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
NLS/pm 
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CLERK, DISTRICT COURT 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. BOU CRF 2013 727 ) Plaintiff, 
vs. ) ) MEMORANDUM DECISI.ON AND 
DARLENE SHEL TON, ) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S ) MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
) 
) Defendant. 
__________ ) 
Defendant Darlene Shelton's Motion to Suppress is DENIED. 
Tevis Hull, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, lawyer for the Plaintiff. 
J. Lynn Brooks, lawyer for Defendant Darlene Shelton. 
**************************************** 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY. 
On June 15, 2013, Darlene Shelton (Shelton) was charged with felony possession of 
methamphetamine, misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia and misdemeanor driving 
. under the influence of alcohol, drugs and/or intoxicating substance. Following the July 26, 
2013, preliminary hearing and a finding of probable cause by the Honorable Lynn Brower, 
Magistrate Judge, an Information was filed on July 29, 2013, charging those three crimes. 
On July 31; 2013, counsel for defendant, Darlene Shelton, filed her Motion to 
'. 
Suppress. On August 27, 2013, Shelton filed her Amended Motion to Suppress'and 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress. On Sept~mber 1 O, 2013, counsel for 
Shelton sent a Notice of Hearing to the Prosecuting Attorney scheduling the hearing on the 
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motion to suppress for September 20, 2013. Up to that time the September 20, 2013, 
hearing the Prosecutor failed to file any brief. On September 20, 2013, District Judge 
Barbara Buchanan rescheduled the hearing on the motion to suppress for October 28, 
2013. As of October 28, 2013, the Prosecutor still had not filed a responsive brief. On 
October 28, 2013, the undersigned conducted the hearing on Shelton's Motion to 
Suppress, heard testimony from Officer Willey Cowell and watched the half-hour DVD 
recording of the June 15, 2013, stop and arrest of Shelton. State's Exhibit 1. At the 
conclusion of that hearing the Court ordered the Prosecutor to file some sort of response 
brief by November 7, 2013, and any additional briefing be filed by Shelton no later than 
November 9, 2013. The State timely submitted its "Brief in Opposition to Suppress." 
Shelton timely submitted "Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress." 
Shelton's Motion to Suppress is now at issue. The case is presently scheduled for a jury 
trial before Judge Buchanan beginning November 12, 2013. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND. 
The following factual summary is primarily from Officer Willie Cowell's testimony at 
the October 29, 2013, hearing on Shelton's Motion to Suppress held before the 
undersigned. At that hearing, the DVD recording of the stop was played to the Court. The 
recording was from a camera affixed to Officer Cowell's chest. Because Shelton has 
referenced the July 26, 2013, preliminary hearing and Officer Cowell's probable cause 
affidavit, this Court will note when facts came from those two sources. 
On or about June 15, 2013, at approximately 7:56 a.m. Officer Cowell of the 
Bonners Ferry Police Department observed a Honda Passport {"the Honda") exit the 
parking lot of Super One Foods in Bonners Ferry, Boundary County, Idaho. According to 
Officer Cowell, the Honda pulled onto Highway 95 Northbound, and, in doing so, the driver 
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failed to use the turn signal and failed to come to a complete stop before entering onto 
Highway 95. Preliminary Hearing, Tr., p. 3, LI. 22-25. Officer Cowell testified that he was 
on Bauman Street when he pulled behind the Honda and activated his overhead lights. 
The driver of the Honda then activated her right turn signal and pulled into the Safeway 
parking lot. According to Officer Cowell, he continued to follow the Honda as the driver 
"made a wide berth around the parking lot[.J" Officer Cowell further testified that at one 
point the Honda was perpendicular to his patrol vehicle, and he could see the driver's face 
and observed that the Honda contained two female occupants. While Officer Cowell's 
vehicle was perpendicular to the Honda, at the time he could see the driver's face there 
was no recognition by the driver that there was an adjacent patrol vehicle with its overhead 
lights on. Preliminary Hearing Tr., p. 4, L. 14 - p. 5, L. 2. At the October 29, 2013, 
hearing, Officer Cowell testified that he followed the Honda about three-quarters around 
the entire outer perimeter of the Safeway parking lot, the entire time with his overhead 
lights on. Eventually the Honda pulled into a parking stall; Officer Cowell parked behind the 
Honda and exited his patrol vehicle. 
As Officer Cowell approached the Honda, he watched the driver of the Honda get 
out of her vehicle while still engaged in conversation with the front seat passenger. When 
the driver turned to go into the store, and thus turned to face the officer, the DVD recording 
verifies Cowell's testimony that the driver was visibly startled to see Cowell standing there. 
At the October 29, 2013, hearing, Officer Cowell testified that at that moment the overhead 
lights of his patrol vehicle were still on. The DVD shows Officer Cowell requested the 
driver to return to her Honda. Officer Cowell requested the driver's license, registration, 
and proof of insurance; the driver was identified as Darlene K. Shelton, the defendant. 
The DVD recording shows Officer Cowell recognized Shelton's passenger. The DVD 
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recording shows Officer Cowell's conversation with both Shelton and her passenger at all 
times was very cordial. 
Some of the remaining factual history can be confusing, depending on which 
hearing or affidavit of Officer Cowell is reviewed. However, this Court finds no 
inconsistency in Officer Cowell's testimony. The Court finds Cowell to be credible. Any 
difference in Cowell's testimony at various times depends on the questions that Cowell was 
or was not asked and the fact that Cowell was investigating possible driving under the 
influence due to drugs and not alcohol. 
According to the probable cause affidavit, upon making contact with Shelton, Officer 
Cowell observed Shelton's eyes were glazed, her speech was excitable and slurred, and 
she seemed unsteady on her feet. Despite these observations, Shelton satisfactorily 
performed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test (indicative of influence of alcohol), one leg 
stand, and partial recital of alphabet. At the preliminary hearing, Officer Cowell simply 
noted Shelton displayed "some physical indicators" that caused him to suspect she may 
have been under the influence. Officer Cowell also stated in the probable cause affidavit 
that he could detect an odor of burnt marijuana and alcoholic beverage coming from the 
Honda. Ultimately, it was determined the odor of alcohol was coming from the female 
passenger. In the DVD recording, Shelton was smoking a cigarette as she exited the 
Honda she was driving, and it appears her passenger was also smoking a cigarette as 
Cowell approached the vehicle. 
Based upon his observations of Shelton, Officer Cowell then requested Shelton 
perform the following Field Sobriety Tests ("FST"): horizontal gaze nystagmus, walk and 
turn, one leg stand, partial recital of the alphabet, backward count, and Romberg balance. 
Probable Cause Affidavit, p. 2. In his probable cause affidavit, Officer Cowell stated 
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Shelton "failed all SFTS's [sic] with the exception of her recital of the partial alphabet." Id. 
At the preliminary hearing, Officer Cowell was very clear that Shelton "failed" the field 
sobriety tests he administered. Preliminary Hearing Tr., p. 6, LI. 22-24. On cross-
examination at the preliminary hearing, Officer Cowell testified he based his conclusion 
that she failed the field sobriety tests based on errors in the walk and turn test and errors in 
counting backwards. Id., p. 16, LI. 24- p. 17, L. 2. However, at no time was Officer 
Cowell asked at the preliminary hearing about Shelton's performance on the Romberg 
Balance test or details about her performance on the one leg stand. Also, at no time was 
Officer Cowell asked at the preliminary hearing about Shelton's speech, dry mouth, 
anxiousness, failure of the eye convergence test and lack of pupil contraction. The Court 
finds no inconsistency with Officer Cowell's testimony at the preliminary hearing as 
compared to his probable cause affidavit or his testimony on October 29, 2013. Any 
difference in his questions is explained by the questions that were asked of him. Officer 
Cowell stated in his probable cause affidavit that while Shelton passed the horizontal gaze 
nystagmus test, Shelton displayed "lack of convergence, dilated pupils and eyelid 
tremors[.]" While that may sound contradictory, at the October 28, 2013, hearing, Officer 
Cowell testified that the horizontal gaze nystagmus test is indicative of alcohol impairment, 
and a lack of convergence is indicative of impairment due to drugs. At the preliminary 
hearing, Officer Cowell testified he is not a drug recognition expert (DRE), and he did not 
conduct a DRE examination of Shelton. While Officer Cowell confirmed such at the 
October 29, 2013, hearing before this Court, Officer Cowell testified that had received 
ARIDE training (advanced roadside detection of non-alcohol impairment) in February 2013. 
At the October 29, 2013, hearing before this Court, Officer Cowell clarified Shelton's 
performance on the testing. He noted the following physical behavior: unsteadiness on 
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her feet, her surprise at his presence, the pupils of her eyes were slightly dilated and were 
not responsive (did not contract) when he shown the light of his flashlight into her eyes, her 
eyes were glassy and a little bloodshot; on HGN her eyes lacked smooth pursuit; her eyes 
lacked convergence {meaning that as the officer brought his flashlight in closer to her nose, 
one eye followed it in as instructed and one eye was lazy); on the walk and turn test she 
stepped off wrong and walked the wrong number of steps; she missed two of the four 
points on the one leg stand test (swinged her arms and raised her arms); she failed the 
counting test; she failed the Rhomberg Balance Test; she seemed anxious and had 
dryness of mouth. Officer Cowell testified that the odor of alcohol he initially detected 
emanating from the vehicle as he stood by Shelton's open driver's window came from the 
passenger and from inside the vehicle where there were a few alcoholic beverages which 
were spilled: a beer in the center console which had been dumped onto the passenger side 
floorboard, and a couple of open containers in the back seat. Officer Cowell testified that 
when he took Shelton to the back of her vehicle to begin the field sobriety tests, he could 
no longer smell alcohol. The lack of odor of alcohol upon Shelton's person was consistent 
with Shelton's negative results on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Conversely, Shelton 
having a positive eye convergence coupled and a negative horizontal gaze nystagmus, 
made it more probable that Shelton was under the influence, but under the influence of 
something other than alcohol. 
Officer Cowell testified at the October 29, 2013, hearing that when he had Shelton 
return to her vehicle and was asking questions of Shelton while she was in the driver's seat 
in the Honda, he could smell: 1) cigarettes, 2) the odor of burnt marijuana, and 3) alcohol. 
At the October 29, 2013, hearing, Officer Cowell testified that based on her performance 
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on the tests, and based on his smelling the odor of burnt marijuana coming from the 
Honda, he felt he had probable cause to search the Honda for evidence of marijuana. 
According to the probable cause affidavit, Officer Cowell's observations " ... led me to 
believe Shelton's intoxication was drug induced". Probable Cause Affidavit, p. 2. 
Specifically, he suspected that drug was marijuana or a Central Nervous Stimulant such as 
methamphetamine. Id. Officer Cowell wrote in his probable cause affidavit: 
Shelton's display of lack of convergence, dilated pupils and eyelid 
tremors led me to believe Shelton was under the influence of marijuana. 
Shelton's talkative mannerisms, signs of anxiety, apparent dryness of her 
mouth which was evident, dilated pupils and sped up internal clock 
(Estimation of 30 seconds passing in 16 seconds), ·indicated to me 
Shelton was also under the influence of a central nervous system (CNS) 
stimulant. CNS stimulants include methamphetamine. 
Id. Officer Cowell explained the "sped up internal clock" at the October 29, 2013, hearing, 
as the Romberg test, where the person being tested must raise their foot and estimate 
thirty seconds, and Shelton's estimate was only sixteen seconds. Following his 
observations at the scene and Shelton's performance completing the FSTs, Officer Cowell 
conducted a search of the Honda. 
In Shelton's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, Shelton argues: 
"However, his [Officer Cowell] articulated grounds for the opinion that Ms. Shelton was 
impaired did not mention the odor of marijuana, either at the scene or at the Preliminary 
Hearing." Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, p. 7. First, Shelton is not 
accurate that there was no mention of the odor of marijuana at the scene. This Court's 
viewing of the DVD of the stop shows that Officer Cowell at the inception of the stop 
mentioned marijuana, and asked Shelton several times about when she last smoked 
marijuana, and asked the same question of the passenger once. Second, the reason 
Officer Cowell did not testify about the smell of marijuana at the preliminary hearing is he 
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was never asked about the subject by either attorney. When Officer Cowell was describing 
what he suspected Shelton to be under the influence of, based on the indicators he 
observed with Shelton, he was interrupted with an objection made by Shelton's attorney. 
Preliminary Hearing Tr., p. 6, LI. 7-15. Officer Cowell can only respond to the questions 
asked, and if both counsel at the preliminary hearing chose not to ask questions about 
facts which gave rise to Officer Cowell's probable cause to conduct a warrantless search, 
that does not mean such facts do not exist. 
In any event, at the October 29, 2013, hearing, Officer Cowell made it very clear 
why he felt he had probable cause to conduct the search: "The search was based on the 
smell of marijuana coming from the vehicle." Officer Cowell also did not outline any such 
facts in his probable cause affidavit. 
During the search of the Honda, Officer Cowell searched Shelton's purse which was 
located "on the floor board directly below the driver's seat", and inside that purse he found 
a substance he suspected to be methamphetamine. Preliminary Hearing Tr., p. 7, LI. 3-11. 
Neither marijuana nor paraphernalia used to smoke marijuana were located in the Honda 
during the search. Following the search, Officer Cowell placed Shelton under arrest for 
possession of a controlled substance and suspicion of driving under the influence. 
Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated; the Court of Appeals 
accepts a trial court's findings of fact supported by substantial evidence and freely reviews 
the court's application of constitutional principles applied to the facts found. State v. 
Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,561,916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App. 1996); State v. Cruz, 144 
Idaho 906, 908, 174 P.3d 876,878 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho 261,264, 
858 P.2d 800, 803 (Ct. App. 1993). When evaluating the trial court's determination of 
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voluntariness of consent given, reviewing courts will not disturb such a decision on appeal 
if the trial court's finding is based on reasonable inferences to be drawn from the record. 
State v. Post, 98 Idaho 834,837,573 P.2d 153, 156 (1978). At a suppression hearing, the 
trial court has the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, and 
draw factual inferences. State v, Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 
(1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App. 1999}. 
Findings are not deemed clearly erroneous when supported by substantial evidence in the 
record. State v. Benson, 133 Idaho 152, 155, 983 P .2d 225, 228 (Ct.App. 1999). 
The application of legal principles to factual findings is given free review. State v. Hiassen, 
110 Idaho 608,611,716 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Ct.App.1986). 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED. 
Due to the undisputed fact that Shelton failed to come to a complete stop and failed 
to use her turn signal, there is no dispute that the initial stop of Shelton was lawful. In her 
briefing, Shelton identifies the following issues: 
1. Was Shelton unlawfully detained? 
2. Was the search of Shelton's purse and vehicle unlawful? 
3. Did Officer Cowell have probable cause to arrest Shelton? 
4. Should the contraband found in Shelton's vehicle be suppressed under the 
exclusionary rule? 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, p. 1. Additionally, the Court will address: 
whether Shelton's detention was unlawfully extended. 
V. ANALYSIS. 
A. The Warrantless Search of Shelton's Vehicle was Lawful. 
Shelton claims the search of her Honda and her purse was unlawful. Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Suppress, pp. 7-9. Shelton argues: "Under the circumstances of 
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this case, Officer Cowell lacked probable cause to search Ms. Shelton's vehicle, which 
contained her purse." Id. p. 9. Shelton continues: 
Ms. Shelton was being detained but was not under arrest at the time of 
the search, so the search could not be justified as a search incident to 
arrest. Officer Cowell represented to Ms. Shelton the he had a right to 
search her vehicle, based on the alleged odor of marijuana. After Officer 
Cowell informed Ms. Shelton that he was going to search her vehicle she 
stated "OK". However, by stating "OK", Ms. Shelton merely acquiesced to 
the officers' claim of authority to search the vehicle. Even if stating "OK" 
could be considered consent to search her vehicle, any such consent was 
ineffective. "A consent to search given during an illegal detention is 
tainted by the illegality and is therefore ineffective." State v. Gutierrez, 
137 Idaho at 652. 
Id. Turns out, when Officer Cowell told Shelton he had probable cause to search her 
Honda, he was right. 
The automobile exception to the warrant requirement allows law enforcement 
officers to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles if they have probable cause to 
believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime. Carro// v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). These searches may include the 
search of any container within the car if the container could reasonably contain the 
suspected contraband or evidence. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 
2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572,594 (1982). Probable cause is the possession of information 
that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest 
and strong presumption that such person is guilty. State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 137, 922 
P.2d 1059, 1063 {1996). When analyzing the existence of probable cause, this Court must 
determine whether the facts available to the officers at the moment of the search 
warranted a person of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate. 
Julian, 129 Idaho at 136, 922 P.2d at 1062; State v. Hobson, 95 Idaho 920, 925, 523 P.2d 
523, 528 {1974). The facts making up the probability are viewed from an objective 
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standpoint. Julian, 129 Idaho at 136-37, 922 P.2d at 1062-63. Additionally, in passing on 
the question of probable cause, the expertise and experience of the officer may be taken 
into account. State v. Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319,323,824 P.2d 894,898 (Ct.App.1991). 
Finally, relevant to the case at bar, is the Idaho Court of Appeals' determination that the 
odor of marijuana is sufficient to establish a warrantless search of the portion of the 
automobile associated with that odor. State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595, 600, 38 P.3d 
633, 638 (Ct.App. 2001 ). In Schmadeka, the Idaho Court of Appeals held the smell of 
marijuana was sufficient to search the interior of the car (in which the officer found the 
source of the marijuana smell, Schmadeka's coat), but not sufficient to search the trunk. 
136 Idaho 595, 599-600, 38 P.3d 633, 637-38. Schmadeka indicates the lack of distinction 
between a vehicle's "glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks and wrapped 
packages" mentioned earlier in State v. Gonzales, 117 Idaho 518, 789 P.2d 206 (Ct.App. 
1990), and as cited by the State in the present case (Brief in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress, p. 7), might no longer be valid, at least as to an unopened trunk when 
the odor emanates from the passenger compartment. That is of no import in the present 
case, as Officer Cowell found Shelton's purse in the passenger compartment. 
In the present case, Officer Cowell had much more than the smell of burnt 
marijuana when he searched the passenger compartment of Shelton's Honda. Officer 
Cowell observed Shelton failing to come to a complete stop, failing to use her turn 
indicator, and being completely oblivious to his presence when he was following with his 
overhead lights for quite some time and at one point was perpendicular to her Honda. 
Officer Cowell observed physical signs indicative not of being under the influence of 
alcohol, but of being under the influence of a drug. Under Schmadeka, Officer Cowell's 
observation of the odor of burnt marijuana coming from the passenger compartment, 
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standing alone, serves as sufficient basis for probable cause to conduct a search of the 
vehicle's passenger compartment. Shelton now argues: "The search of Ms. Shelton's 
vehicle which resulted in the discovery of alleged methamphetamine was the direct result 
of Officer Cowell's incredible claim that he smelled the odor of marijuana smoke, distinct 
from the odor of cigarette smoke that undisputedly was fresh in her vehicle." Defendant's 
Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, p. 6. This Court could not disagree more. 
Officer Cowell's testimony regarding the smell of marijuana was not impeached. Shelton 
admitted smoking marijuana the night before and the stop occurred at 7:30 a.m. Officer 
Cowell testified as to his familiarity with the smell of burn marijuana. Because the Court 
finds Officer Cowell's testimony regarding the smell of marijuana credible, on that basis 
alone Officer Cowell had probable cause to search the passenger compartment of the 
Honda. In the present case, there is much more evidence of being under the influence of a 
drug than simply the smell of marijuana; Shelton's failure to stop, failure to signal, 
obliviousness for the better part of a minute as to Officer Cowell's overhead lights, her 
visible appearance of dry mouth, slurred speech, anxiousness, unsteadiness, pupils not 
responding, lack of eye convergence, and her performance on the field sobriety tests, 
collectively provide a plethora of additional probable cause for Officer Cowell to search the 
passenger compartment of Shelton's Honda. As to some of these, Shelton makes the 
argument that the specific symptom in Shelton observed by Officer Cowell is capable of an 
explanation other than being under the influence. For example, Shelton claims that while 
Shelton was observed to have had a "dry mouth", Officer Cowell noted that while testifying, 
he too had a dry mouth " ... but denied that he was intoxicated at the time." Defendant's 
Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, p. 2. At the October 29, 2013, hearing, 
Officer Cowell testified that dry mouth was "just another indicator." That is certainly how 
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the Court views it. While a dry mouth might be experienced for a variety of reasons, it is 
one more piece of evidence added to the probable cause pile, and with Shelton, that pile 
quickly became a sizeable heap. Shelton argues: 'There was no driving pattern which 
indicated that Ms. Shelton was impaired." Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to 
Suppress, p. 1. The Court disagrees. Shelton failed to stop for a stop sign, failed to use 
her turn signal, and failed to recognize law enforcement vehicle with its overhead lights on 
for nearly a minute. Those are all signs of inattentiveness and intoxication. Next, Shelton 
claims the fact that it was a sunny day made the overhead lights on Officer Cowell's vehicle 
less visible. While true, the fact of a sunny day does not make the overhead lights on 
Officer Cowell's vehicle invisible, and for the better part of a minute Shelton failed ever look 
back and see what was capable of being seen, a police officer trying to pull her over. 
Shelton then makes the argument: "It is Ms. Shelton's contention that the video shows that 
Officer Cowell was incorrect when he opined that Ms. Shelton's speech was excitable and 
slurred, that she was unsteady on her feet, and that she displayed 'anxiety'". Id., p. 2. The 
Court agrees it would not use the word "excitable" to describe what the Court saw on the 
recording of the stop. Exhibit 1. But the Court does find the recording shows Shelton to 
have occasional slurred speech, was unsteady on her feet, and that she displayed anxiety. 
All these features are relative, the Court has seen people who can barely talk and stand, 
but this Court finds Officer Cowell's assessment at the October 29, 2013, hearing, that 
Shelton "seemed more anxious than the general motoring public", to be credible. Again, it 
is the collective heap of evidence that must be kept in mind, not each individual piece of 
evidence taken out and inspected in isolation, and placed back on the heap. 
An officer's warrantless entry of a vehicle to search it or to seize items within it is 
presumptively a violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
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searches; The State has the burden to prove that the search falls within one of the 
narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218,219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Gomez, 144 Idaho 865,870, 
172 P.3d 1140 (Ct.App.2007). When a warrantless search has been challenged, it is the 
State's burden to prove the applicability of an exception. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443,455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 l.Ed.2d 564 (1971); State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218-
19, 984 P.2d 703 (1999). If the government fails to meet its burden, the evidence obtained 
as a result of the search, including later-discovered evidence derived by exploitation of the 
original illegal search, is inadmissible in court. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804, 
104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984); Brauch, 133 Idaho at 219. 
The automobile exception to the warrant requirement allows law enforcement 
officers to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles if they have probable cause to 
believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime. Carro// v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 
347, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009). These searches may include the 
search of any container within the car if the container could reasonably contain the 
suspected contraband or evidence. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 
2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572,594 (1982). "Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent 
occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains 
evidence of the offense of arrest." State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509,515,236 P.3d 1269, 
1275 (2010) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1723-24 (2009) (emphasis.added). 
"[P]robable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard." State v. Ramirez, 121 
Idaho 319,323,824 P.2d 894,898 (Ct. App. 1991). It requires that the facts available to 
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the officer would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that certain items may 
be contraband or useful as evidence of a crime. Id. Probable cause does not demand 
proof that such a belief is accurate or more likely true than false. Id. "The officer's 
determination of probable cause must be based on objective facts which would be 
sufficient to convince a magistrate to issue a warrant under similar circumstances." Id. 
When analyzing the existence of probable cause, the Court must determine whether 
the facts available to the officers at the moment of the search warranted a person of 
reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate. Julian, 129 Idaho at 
136, 922 P.2d at 1062; State v. Hobson, 95 Idaho 920, 925, 523 P.2d 523, 528 (1974). 
The facts making up the probability are viewed from an objective standpoint. Julian, 129 
Idaho at 136-37, 922 P.2d at 1062-63. Additionally, in passing on the question of probable 
cause, the expertise and experience of the officer may be taken into account. State v. 
Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319,323,824 P.2d 894,898 (Ct.App.1991). 
Here, Officer Cowell noted in his probable cause affidavit that he detected the odor 
of burnt marijuana and alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle. At the October 29, 
2013, hearing, Officer Cowell testified he smelled burnt marijuana, cigarettes and alcohol 
coming from the passenger compartment of the Honda. At that hearing, Officer Cowell 
testified as to his past experience and training regarding the smell of burnt marijuana, his 
training in law enforcement regarding the same, and he described how he was able to 
distinguish that smell from the smell of cigarettes which were being smoked by both 
Shelton and her passenger when Officer Cowell arrived. Shelton's most recent argument 
that Officer Cowell is inconsistent because " ... at the preliminary hearing he did not mention 
smelling the odor of cigarette smoke" (Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to 
Suppress, p. 5, citing "Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, p. 13, L 21-23) is not only 
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unavailing, it is misleading. Officer Cowell was never asked if he smelled cigarette smoke 
coming from the passenger compartment of the Honda. Officer Cowell was pointedly 
asked whether as he approached Shelton's vehicle both Shelton and her passenger were 
smoking cigarettes, to which Officer Cowell responded "I don't remember." This Court 
finds no inconsistency in Officer Cowell's testimony. Shelton then makes the argument: 
Officer Cowelf's testimony at the Suppression Hearing that he could smell 
the odor of marijuana smoke even though Ms. Shelton and her passenger 
were actively smoking cigarettes at the time of Officer Cowell's contact 
with them; and that he could distinguish between the blended odors of 
cigarette smoke and marijuana smoke, should be disregarded by the 
Court as inherently not credible. 
Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, p. 5. The Court finds that 
argument entirely baseless. While we are not as gifted as a dog, humans can smell more 
than one odor at a time. 
Regarding the smell of alcohol, Officer Cowell testified he later determined the odor 
of alcohol was emanating from the female passenger. That is because after he separated 
Shelton from her vehicle, he no longer smelled alcohol. Officer Cowell also indicated that 
he suspected Shelton of driving under the influence of drugs. The lack of the odor of 
alcohol upon Shelton's person, and the negative horizontal gaze nystagmus test, confirms 
Shelton not being under the influence of alcohol. But if there is evidence that Shelton is 
under the influence of something (and this Court finds there is ample evidence of that), the 
fact that alcohol is essentially ruled out makes also it more likely that she is under the 
influence of a drug. 
There is no indication that there was anything within the officer's plain view which 
would have alerted Officer Cowell as to the presence of contraband inside the vehicle. 
However, "plain view" is not necessary. As noted above, the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement permits the warrantless search of a vehicle if it is reasonable to 
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believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Here, at the point Officer 
Cowell decided to conduct the vehicle search the offense for an arrest would have been 
driving under the influence. The vehicle did in fact have evidence of driving under the 
influence of alcohol as there were three opened containers. Due to the way Shelton 
responded to the tests, Officer Cowell suspected she was under the influence of drugs 
and, due to the smell of burnt marijuana and some of Shelton's manifestations, Officer 
Cowell thought the drug was marijuana. But Officer Cowell also suspected a CNS such as 
methamphetamine was involved, due to some of Shelton's other physical manifestations. 
Officer Cowell thus was looking for evidence of marijuana use and use of a central nervous 
stimulant such as methamphetamine. 
This Court finds Officer Cowell had probable cause to search Shelton's vehicle for 
evidence of marijuana use or central nervous stimulant use, since Officer Cowell 
suspected Shelton was under the influence of that type of controlled substances. 
B. Officer Cowell had Probable Cause to Arrest Shelton. 
Shelton argues Officer Cowell did not have probable cause to arrest her. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, pp. 9-11. Shelton argues: 
In this case, Officer Cowell's opinion of Ms. Shelton's performance 
on the field sobriety tests is in dispute. The video in this case does not 
show all of the mistakes that Officer Cowell claimed that Ms. Shelton 
made on the walk and turn test. Officer Cowell does not dispute that Ms. 
Shelton passed the horizontal gaze nystagmus, one leg stand and 
alphabet tests. Therefore, the only test Ms. Shelton may have failed was 
the counting backwards test. 
Id., p. 11. After watching the DVD of the stop, this Court disagrees with Shelton. The 
video shows Shelton's lack of attention when confronted by Officer Cowell. The video 
shows her failure on the Romberg test, convergence eye test, hands to side, counting 
backwards. The only test she performed correctly was counting backwards. Specifically, 
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regarding the walk and tum test, the video shows Shelton failed Officer Cowelf's 
instructions to count each step out loud, shows she asked for instructions again less than 
half-way through the test, shows she took the wrong number of steps, shows she stepped 
off wrong, and shows she was unsteady. Shelton then argues: 
Officer Cowell's finding of probable cause is not supported by the 
objective facts in this case. Under the all [sic] following circumstances of 
this case: (a) pulling onto Highway 95 without using a turn signal; (b) Ms. 
Shelton not noticing Officer Cowell behind her with his overhead lights on 
for 45 seconds to one minute; (c) Ms. Shelton not noticing Office [sic] 
Cowell standing behind her while she was engaged in conversation with 
her passenger; ( d) an allegedly failed walk and turn test; and ( e) passed 
horizontal gaze nystagmus test, one leg stand test and alphabet test; 
Officer Cowell could not have had an "honest and strong suspicion" that 
Ms. Shelton was guilty of driving under the influence, as required by law in 
order to have probable cause for arrest. 
Id. Shelton's list of circumstances omits that Shelton failed to stop for a stop sign, and 
most importantly, omits Officer Cowell's smelling burnt marijuana emanating from the 
passenger compartment of Shelton's vehicle. This Court specifically finds Officer Cowell 
had an honest and strong suspicion that Shelton was guilty of driving under the influence of 
drugs. While Shelton passed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, all that did was help 
Officer Cowell determine Shelton was not likely under the influence of alcohol. As to all the 
other testing, the only test Shelton performed correctly was spelling. All other tests were 
performed incorrectly. The incorrectly-performed tests, Shelton's appearance, the smell of 
marijuana and the lack of eye convergence convince this Court that Officer Cowell had an 
honest and strong suspicion that Shelton was guilty of driving under the influence of drugs. 
More recently, Shelton argues "Ms. Shelton performed well on the field sobriety tests." 
Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, p. 6. This Court finds that claim 
to be entirely false. 
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A warrantless arrest is lawful when based upon probable cause. State v. Veneroso, 
138 Idaho 925, 928, 71 P.3d 1072, 1075 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 
870, 874, 11 P.3d 489, 493 (Ct.App.2000)). (See rules above regarding probable cause). 
The requirement of probable cause does not mean that arresting officers 
must have sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. Rather, the test is 
whether "the facts and circumstances within the officers" knowledge and 
of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to 
warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was 
committing an offense. 
State v. Hollon, 136 Idaho 499, 36 P.3d 1287, 1290, (Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 
379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223,225 (1964)) (internal alterations and quotations omitted). 
Here, Shelton was arrested for both Driving Under the Influence and Possession of 
Controlled Substance. This Court has already found there was probable cause for Officer 
Cowell to search the Honda. 
As for the arrest of Shelton for suspicion of Driving Under the Influence, the facts 
which gave rise to probable cause for her arrest included: Shelton's failure to successfully 
perform the walk and turn and backward counting tests and Officer Cowell's observations 
that Shelton displayed "lack of convergence, dilated pupils and eyelid tremors" as well as 
her "talkative mannerisms, signs of anxiety, apparent dryness of her mouth which was 
evidence, dilated pupils and sped up internal clock[.)" Probable Cause Affidavit, p. 2; 
Officer Cowell's Testimony at October 29, 2013 Hearing. As noted, in order to arrest 
Shelton, Officer Cowell was not required to have facts sufficient to obtain a conviction for 
driving under the influence. The totality of circumstances within Officer Cowell's knowledge 
simply had to be sufficient such that a prudent man would believe that Shelton had 
committed the offense of driving under the influence. Despite Shelton's successful 
performance on two of the field sobriety tests, based upon all the facts and circumstances, 
Officer Cowell had probable cause to arrest Shelton for driving under the influence. 
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C. The Exclusionary Rule Cannot be Applied to these Facts. 
Shelton correctly notes: "Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of illegal government action. 
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810-811 (2009); State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841,846 (2004); 
see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,485 (1963)." Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Suppress, p. 12. This Court finds Shelton was not unlawfully detained and 
this Court finds the search of Shelton's Honda and her purse was lawful. Because this 
Court finds Shelton's Fourth Amendment rights have not been violated, the exclusionary 
rule is not applicable. 
D. Shelton's Detention was not Unlawfully Extended. 
Shelton does not make a separate argument about the extent of the detention, but 
Shelton does state: "In the present case, the alleged contraband was found by Officer 
Cowell as a direct result of his unlawfully extended detention of Ms. Shelton .... " 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, p. 13. The entire recording of the stop 
and detention was thirty minutes. State's Exhibit 1. The State claims "The time for the 
stop, initial investigation, field sobriety evaluations, partial search of the vehicle, and arrest 
was approximately 25 minutes." Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress, 
p. 5. The Court finds that to be accurate. 
An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop. State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886,889, 187 P.3d 1261, 
1264 (Ct. App. 2008). There is no rigid time limit for determining when a detention has 
lasted longer than necessary; rather, a court must consider the scope of the detention and 
the law enforcement purposes to be served, as well as the duration of the stop. United 
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1985). When a person is detained, the scope of 
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detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. State v. Parkinson, 135 
Idaho 357, 361, 17 P.3d 301, 305 (Ct. App. 2000). The scope of the intrusion permitted 
will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Ramirez, 
145 Idaho at 889. However, any routine traffic stop might turn up suspicious 
circumstances that could justify an officer asking further questions unrelated to the stop. 
State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916, 42 P.3d 706, 709 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
Accordingly, the length and scope of the initial investigatory detention may be 
lawfully expanded if there exists objective and specific, particular facts that justify suspicion 
that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. Id. 
That said, however, "if an officer questions a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic 
stop after the purpose of the stop has been fulfilled, the questioning, no matter how short, 
extends the duration of the stop and is an unwarranted intrusion upon the privacy and 
liberty of the vehicle's occupants." State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 8,217 P.3d 1, 8 (Ct. 
App. 2009), citing State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651-53, 51 P.3d 461, 465-67 (Ct. App. 
2002). 
In order to extend the scope or duration of a detention the officer must have 
objective and specific, particular facts that justify suspicion that the detained person is, has 
been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 
916, 42 P.3d 706, 709 (Ct. App. 2001). 
There can be no doubt there is a justifiable reason for Officer Cowell to stop 
Shelton ... Shelton failed to stop at a stop sign and failed to use her turn signal. Shelton 
does not contest there was good reason for the stop. By the time Shelton was stopped, 
Officer Cowell had additional evidence of Shelton's inattentiveness. As discussed above, 
immediately upon making contact with Shelton, Officer Cowell made several observations 
-131-
r ! I, 
regarding Shelton's appearance, her mannerisms and what he smelled (alcohol, marijuana 
and cigarettes). Additionally, though not explicit in the record, it appears that the 
investigation for the initial purpose for the stop (failure to use a turn signal and failure to 
stop at a stop sign) was not completed prior to Officer Cowell developing the suspicion that 
Shelton had been driving under the influence. The Court arrives at this conclusion 
because Officer Cowell noticed the odor of alcohol and marijuana immediately after 
beginning his discussion with Shelton, right after he had her return to her Honda and 
began asking her questions. Detection of those odors coupled with her driving certainly 
justified Officer Cowell in requesting Shelton to perform field sobriety tests. Officer Cowell 
stated in his probable cause affidavit that he developed a suspicion that Shelton was 
engaged in the criminal activity of driving under the influence based upon her glazed eyes, 
excitable speech and slurred speech, and unsteadiness on her feet. Therefore, because 
Officer Cowell extended the duration of the detention based upon objective and specific, 
particular facts (Shelton's driving led to the stop, the stop led to detection of odors, the 
presence of odors led to field sobriety tests, which led to Shelton's arrest), the stop was not 
unlawfully extended. 
VII. CONCLUSION. 
Based upon the evidence before the Court at this time Shelton's Motion to Suppress 
must be denied. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, Officer Cowell had probable 
cause to search Shelton's Honda and her purse, Officer Cowell had probable cause to 
arrest Shelton, and the detention was not unlawfully extended. 
VII. ORDER. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Darlene Shelton's Motion to Suppress is 
DENIED. 
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